

## Chapter 5: The Doctrine of God: His Unshared Attributes: Part 2

In this chapter, we continue our discussion of the unshared attributes of God. Our method is the same. As in the previous chapter, by “attributes” we mean those qualities of God’s nature that make him what he is. By “unshared” attributes we draw attention once more to those attributes that answer the question, “How is God not like us?” As we continue to answer that question, we’ll occasionally note some theological tensions raised by the remaining unshared attributes: immutability, omnipotence, omniscience, and three-in-oneness (triunity). We’ll pick up our numbering from the previous chapter.

### *God’s Unshared Attributes, Continued: More Ways God is Not Like Us*

#### 11. Independence

The term “independence” expresses the idea that God is entirely self-sufficient, requiring nothing external to himself for his existence and well-being. In short the attribute of independence communicates the idea that God needs nothing to be God. Scripture is clear that God needs nothing in or beyond creation to exist. Acts 17:24-25 notes that “The God who made the world and everything in it, being Lord of heaven and earth, does not live in temples made by man, nor is he served by human hands, as though he needed anything, since he himself gives to all mankind life and breath and everything.” God’s existence depends on nothing; the reverse is equally true—the existence and maintenance of all things depends on God (Rev 4:11; Col 1:17). Lastly, in theological discourse, this attribute is at times referred to as self-sufficiency or aseity (from the Latin words *a se* which mean “from himself”),<sup>1</sup> though other theologians use the latter term to describe how God has no external origin.<sup>2</sup>

#### 12. Infinity

That God is infinite means he is unlimited and can never be limited. The attribute is related to God’s omnipresence, that God is everywhere at all times. Psalm 139:7-10 helps describe the attribute: “Where shall I go from your Spirit? Or where shall I flee from your presence? If I ascend to heaven, you are there! If I make my bed in Sheol, you are there! If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea, even there your hand shall lead me, and your right hand shall hold me.” As one theologian notes, “Sometimes this attribute is

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<sup>1</sup> Wayne A. Grudem, *Systematic Theology: An Introduction to Biblical Doctrine* (Leicester, England; Grand Rapids, MI: Inter-Varsity Press; Zondervan Pub. House, 2004), 160.

<sup>2</sup> Bray, *The Attributes of God: An Introduction*, 50.

labeled immensity. It differs from omnipresence in that it emphasizes the transcendence of God (because He is not bound by space).”<sup>3</sup>

### 13. Immutability

The term “immutability” refers to God being unchangeable and, therefore, unchanging. Malachi 3:6 and James 1:17 say rather directly that God is unchanging. Other passages that echo this assertion include Psa 33:11; 102:26-27. Numbers 23:19 says that “God is not man, that he should lie, or a son of man, that he should change his mind.” Immutability seems a theological necessity not only in light of these verses, but also logic. God cannot grow or increase, or become lesser and decrease, for he is a perfect being. His perfection disallows any modification of his essential being.

#### 13.1. Tensions

In light of these and other passages, what are we to make of instances that seem to clearly have God undergoing a change of heart or responding emotionally? Genesis 6:6 clearly has God regretting (Hebrew verb *naḥam*) that he made humankind in the wake of human corruption. Jonah 3:10 has God “relenting” when the people of Nineveh repented, using the very same verb. Jeremiah 18:8 informs us that God actually *promises* to “relent” (again, the same verb) when people turn from evil.

These apparently contradictory passages actually provide a way toward addressing the tension. The contexts differ but God’s character is shown to be consistent. He desires repentance, and so he responds accordingly when people repent, withholding judgment. The reverse is also true. When there is deliberate rebellion then the rebel will reap what is sown. As an example of the latter, 1 Sam 15:29 says that God will not “regret” (once more, the same verb, *naḥam*) his judgment on Saul for his rebellion. God irrevocably decided to remove the kingship from Saul and give it to David (1 Samuel 16). Consequently, on one level, immutability can be perceived as that quality of God that ensures his core essence and all his attributes never change or diminish. God will never be less powerful, eternal, imperishable, infinite, etc. God’s perfections (his essential being) and his purposes (the plans known to him, and only to him in an exhaustive sense) do not change. “The counsel of the LORD stands forever, the plans of his heart to all generations” (Ps. 33:11). As Grudem notes,

This general statement about God’s counsel is supported by several specific verses that talk about individual plans or purposes of God that he has had for all eternity (Matt. 13:35; 25:34; Eph. 1:4, 11; 3:9, 11; 2 Tim. 2:19; 1 Peter 1:20; Rev. 13:8). Once God has determined that he will assuredly bring something about, his purpose is unchanging,

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<sup>3</sup> Ryrie, *Basic Theology*, 44.

and it will be achieved. In fact, God claims through Isaiah [46:9-11] that no one else is like him in this regard.<sup>4</sup>

But what about God's relationship to his created beings, particularly human beings? God must be consistent in his character and sovereign purposes, even when maintaining that consistency requires some response in him that could be viewed by mortal humans as a change. In discussing the work of the Dutch theologian Isaak August Dorner (1809–1884), Gerald Bray observed:

Dorner believed that God is immutable in his self-understanding and in his ethical principles, but that he can and does change in his relationship to sinful (and mutable) humanity. Indeed, it is precisely because of his immutability that he must change when dealing with his creatures. Here we must avoid confusing the divine nature with the personal relationship(s) God has with his creatures. No one has ever questioned the fact that God acts in different ways toward human beings according to the behavior of the latter or for some other reason connected with them, and all classical theologians have agreed that he does not thereby change in himself. Difficulties arise only when it is presupposed that a change of outward behavior caused by external circumstances necessitates an internal change of some kind, on the ground that, otherwise, God would be left indifferent to his creatures' actions. But this presupposition is a mistake. It is because God does not change that he can (and does) apply the same standards and principles to his actions, whatever the circumstances might be. It is this consistency that guarantees his justice, since, if he were susceptible to change according to the situation facing him, there is no telling what he might end up doing. If God were swayed by every change of fortune, he could hardly be trusted to save us from anything.<sup>5</sup>

The attribute of immutability also necessarily raises the problem of divine impassibility. Opinion is divided among theologians as to whether the idea is biblically defensible. In brief terms, those theologians who accept the idea say it is properly understood as referring to God's immunity to suffering and harm. This sounds completely acceptable, but those opposed contend that the concept must mean that God does not have passions or emotions.<sup>6</sup> This would in turn mean that part of God's immutability means he is unmoved by our pain and prayers since he cannot be affected by any outside force.

This doesn't seem at all coherent. The Scriptures have many examples of divine emotional response. God rejoices (Deut 28:63; Isa 62:5). He can be grieved (Psa 78:40; Eph 4:30). He gets angry (Exod 22:24; 32:10; Deut 9:7-8, 22). He is said to be jealous, unwilling to share his glory or worship (Exod 20:5; 34:14; Deut 4:24). He can be moved to compassion (Exod 34:6; Psa 103:13;

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<sup>4</sup> Grudem, *Systematic Theology*, 164-165.

<sup>5</sup> Bray, *The Attributes of God: An Introduction*, 45–46.

<sup>6</sup> See for example Grudem, *Systematic Theology*, 165.

Isa 14:1). He is a loving God (Exod 34:6; Isa. 54:8; Ps. 103:17; 1 John 4:8). God also forgives (Num 14:18; Neh 9:17; Jonah 3:10) or withholds forgiveness (Exod 23:21; Josh 24:19). God is just and a dispenser of justice (Deut 32:4; Job 34:12; Isa 5:16). Paul informs us that God was somehow “in Christ” at his sufferings (2 Cor 5:19). And surely God must continue to suffer as he witnesses all the evil that it is possible to witness.<sup>7</sup> Further, if God is truly a person (i.e., has personality), it would seem personhood requires emotional capacity.

How are we to balance God’s immutability and the passages that affirm he is unchanging (Mal 3:6; Jas 1:17) with such instances of divine emotional response? The struggle, as earlier, is to understand how God can be unchanging (“immutable”) and transcendent and yet responsive to the lives and circumstances of his creatures. One theologian writes:

The topic of divine impassibility is an attempt to discuss the emotional life of God as it were. One aspect of this doctrine is the question of the extent to which God can be said to have an emotional life, or whether the word “emotion” should even be applied to God. It frequently is used of the possibility of God being affected by the created order. As such, it has both a strong and a weak sense. In the strong sense, God is completely unaffected or unmoved by anything taking place within the created order or any considerations based on it. The weaker sense of the word conceives of God as affected by the creation, but not being especially emotionally affected. This God is never perturbed, upset, or disturbed, in the fashion in which humans are. He never loses control of himself. He is completely cool and rational in his assessment of things and in his reaction to them. . . . [T]he concept of impassibility is quite complex, and several different meanings are intended by those who use the term. It is sometimes correlated with a number of other doctrines or attributes of God, including eternity, immutability, simplicity, omniscience, and omnipotence . . . . To those who hold to divine impassibility, the doctrine seems important because it guards the transcendence of God. A God who experiences the same sort of emotions we do, who is affected by all that transpires within creation, appears to be a captive of forces beyond him. To the opponents of this view, on the other hand, impassibility appears to make God remote, unresponsive, unsympathetic, even indifferent. It seems to make him something less than fully loving.<sup>8</sup>

A solution is perhaps achievable if, as with our earlier tension involving immutability, that of God expressing regret (see above), we filter the issue by the will or plan of God. Erickson explains:

Immutability means simply that God does not change his will, or in the stronger sense of the word, that he *cannot* change his will. It does not specify the source or influence of

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<sup>7</sup> On divine suffering, see Alister E. McGrath, *Christian Theology: An Introduction* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 213–22.

<sup>8</sup> Erickson, *God the Father Almighty*, 141, 143. Erickson has a lengthy discussion on the history and problems of divine impassibility (pp. 141-164). It is recommended only for advanced students of philosophy and theology.

this excluded change. Impassibility of will, on the other hand, is the position that God's will is not affected by anything external to him. It does not exclude the possibility that God would change his will by his own initiative, only the idea of external cause or influence.<sup>9</sup>

If we understand God must always be consistent in his will, it would seem the emotions he experiences can still be experienced, but that his will remains immutable. His character does not change. Further, we must avoid presuming that God's emotional responses align with our own. As Erickson notes elsewhere, "If we take seriously the idea that God is both transcendent and immanent, then his emotions must in some sense be both similar to ours and yet to some extent different from ours."<sup>10</sup>

## 14. Omnipotence

The word "omnipotent" means "all powerful." Scripture conveys the idea in several ways, including the use of the word "Almighty" as a description of God (e.g., Gen 17:1; 35:11; Psa 91:1; 2 Cor 6:18; Rev 1:8; 19:6). Job 11:7 suggests the term conveys some sense of limitlessness. The rhetorical question of Jer 32:27 also expresses the idea: "Behold, I am the LORD, the God of all flesh. Is anything too hard for me?" The answer had already been forthcoming in Jer 32:17: "Ah, Lord GOD! It is you who have made the heavens and the earth by your great power and by your outstretched arm! Nothing is too hard for you."

### 14.1. Tensions

It should be readily apparent that God's omnipotence needs nuancing. It is inaccurate to assume the attribute and the doctrine means God can (or should be able to) do anything and everything. There are very obviously things that God cannot do. God cannot lie (Num 23:19; Heb 6:18; Titus 1:2). He cannot be tempted to do evil (James 1:13). It goes without saying that God cannot sin or be unfaithful to his promises. He also cannot cease to exist (cf. his attribute of eternity). God cannot forget (in the sense of losing comprehension of something).<sup>11</sup>

Consequently, it is more accurate to say that omnipotence means that God can do anything consistent with his own moral nature. God can act in any way consistent with his own orderly character. God can do whatever he wishes, and he will not wish to act in some way contrary to his internal being.

This qualification provides the answer to absurdities like "Can God make square circles?" or "Can God make a rock too heavy for him to lift." The answer is no. God cannot perform

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid., 149.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid., 161.

<sup>11</sup> Scriptural prayers of course ask God to forget (or not remember) sin (Psa 25:7; Isa 64:9), or not forget the afflicted (Psa 10:12). These are negative expressions seeking a positive response; i.e., for God to forgive and render justice.

absurdities inconsistent with the orderliness of his own nature. God is a God of order, not absurdity. Of the “heavy rock” absurdity Bray observes,

As always with such things, the argument is made nonsensical by the difference between the infinite and the finite, between the Creator and his creation. God does not “lift” anything, because such an action is alien to his being. Those who think in such terms are really turning him into a glorified human being, which is the very essence of paganism.<sup>12</sup>

In short, failure to produce the absurd on God’s part is not an argument against omnipotence, for it would require God act in a way contrary with his essential being.<sup>13</sup>

## 15. Omniscience

The term “omniscience” refers to the attribute of being all-knowing. Ryrie defines it succinctly: “God knows everything, things actual and possible, effortlessly and equally well.”<sup>14</sup> This attribute is consistent with God’s omnipresence, his ability to be present everywhere. It logically follows then that he knows everything. Omniscience is also of importance for omnipotence:

. . . [I]t would not be very helpful if [God] were to exercise his power without the understanding needed to do so wisely and well. In that sense, his omniscience complements his omnipresence and his omnipotence. It is because he is everywhere that he sees, and therefore knows, everything, and it is because he knows everything that he is able to exercise his power in the most constructive way.<sup>15</sup>

The Bible puts forth the notion of divine omniscience by declaring God the possessor of knowledge impossible to all other created beings. Job 38:4-6 expresses God’s intimate knowledge of creation as he performed the acts of power in bringing about creation. The scope of his knowledge includes all the stars (Psa 147:4). God is “perfect in knowledge” (Job 37:16). John puts things simply: God knows everything (1 John 3:20). God also knows himself perfectly; nothing about his own nature is unknown to him (1 Cor 2:10-11). He knows the end from the beginning of all things (Isa 46:9-10). God knows what we need before we ask him (Matt 6:8). God has foreknowledge of events before they occur (Jer 1:4-5; Gal 1:15-16). Indeed, God’s omniscience is the attribute behind predictive prophecy. As an eternal being who can, if he wills, live inside or outside time, the future is known to him. The Bible has many instances where God knows the future and, at times, reveals the future to prophets (e.g., 1 Kings 8:15-20; Daniel 4; Isa 48:1-5; Matt 4:14 [cp. Isa 9:1-2]; John 19:36 [cp. Exod 12:46; 1 Cor 5:7]).

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<sup>12</sup> Bray, *The Attributes of God*, 68.

<sup>13</sup> See Erickson, *God the Father Almighty*, 171-183 for a philosophical / theological discussion of God’s omnipotent in relation to absurdities and contradictions. It is recommended only for advanced students of philosophy and theology.

<sup>14</sup> Ryrie, *Basic Theology*, 47.

<sup>15</sup> Bray, *The Attributes of God*, 70.

## 15.1. Tension

Though professional theologians and philosophers find several difficulties with omniscience,<sup>16</sup> for our purposes, the most common tension has to do with the attribute and human free will. It is commonly assumed that God's foreknowledge necessitates predestination, but this is demonstrably untrue in scriptural terms. In 1 Sam 23, the incident of David at the walled city of Keilah, David asks God two questions: (1) V. 11 – Now that Saul knows his enemy (David) is in the city, will he come to the city to surround it, trapping David inside? (2) V. 12 – Given that event where Saul's army would surround the city, will the men of Keilah turn him over to Saul? God answers in the affirmative both times—yet neither incident ever occurs, for upon hearing God's responses, David leaves the city. God clearly foreknew two events that never occur, and so by definition his foreknowledge did not dictate predestination.

More specifically, the tension is found in things that *do* happen, not those things that might. And yet the Keilah incident is illustrative of the fact that foreknowledge in and of itself doesn't necessitate predestination. This opens the door to saying that things that do occur may have been predestinated, but perhaps they were not. There is no necessary link between foreknowing and pre-ordaining. God is not forced to predestinate what he knows will happen. For sure it seems from some passages that God does predestinate some events. Acts 4:28 uses such language of the crucifixion of Jesus. God in some sense predestines believers (Rom 8:29-30; Eph 1:5, 11). Whether this language refers to predestinating an individual's salvation or the means by which individuals are saved is not clear (i.e., is predestination in these passages about individuals or the plan of God and the resulting body of Christ?)

The tension is over the idea put forth by some theologians that God predestinates every event that happens, including acts of evil. Not only does this abolish human free will (defined as the genuine ability to choose A or B, uncoerced by God's foreknowledge), but it suggests God either wants evil to occur (it is good for his plan's outworking) or needs evil to occur for his overall plan to work. This is predestination fatalism.

Other than leaving the question open—giving God the freedom to predestinate what happens or not—some theologians opt for what has become called “middle knowledge” (technically, “Molinism,” named after the 16th century philosopher-theologian who devised the approach). Middle knowledge puts forth the following ideas:

God cannot know future free acts in the way he knows other things. God knows some things absolutely, but future free acts are known only contingently. . . . [T]his middle or intermediate knowledge is in some sense dependent on what free creatures choose to do. God's omniscience “waits” to see what a free creature does “before” he selects those who will be saved. Since God is eternal, the sequence is only logical, not

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<sup>16</sup> See the lengthy discussion in Erickson, *God the Father Almighty*, 189-210. As in earlier footnotes, this recommended only for advanced students of philosophy and theology.

chronological. . . . Biblical arguments for Molinism are based on passages such as 1 Samuel 23:6–13 and Matthew 11:20–24. God knew that if David were to remain in the city, Saul would come to kill him. So if God’s answers through the ephod are taken to be simple foreknowledge, his knowledge was false. What was predicted did not happen. Only if the answers are taken as what would happen under certain freely chosen circumstances were they true. This would indicate that God had contingent knowledge of them. In Matthew 11 Jesus asserts that the ancient cities he mentions would have repented if they had seen Jesus’ miracles. But this makes sense only if God’s knowledge is contingent on what they would have done.<sup>17</sup>

The pushback on middle knowledge is whether the idea of God “waiting” to see what humans will do, thus making his knowledge contingent, is biblical. Theologians argue both sides. Critics will presume God that God’s attribute of eternity requires the notion that God exists outside of time. As an eternal being (by that definition), God knows all things “before” they occur and he knows them “in eternity,” so he does not need to wait for things to happen.<sup>18</sup> Those theologians who presume God has chosen, post-creation, to exist in relationship to time with his creatures (that is, God can move in and out of time as he wills), do not have this struggle with middle knowledge. Those who advocate for middle knowledge (or some other non-fatalist view) may also use the tension with God’s omnipotence as an analogy to allowing the “waiting” language to be used of God. Just as God’s ordered nature doesn’t allow him to create square circles—and this be no harm to omnipotence—so God’s omniscience may have normative limitations of the type described by middle knowledge.

## 16. Providence

Care for creation is part of God’s ongoing work of providence. God not only preserves his creation but oversees its progression toward the ends to which he planned. Guidance of creation and created things of course includes oversight of God’s intelligent creatures, such as angels, but also human beings and their affairs. The Westminster Confession (5.1, 4) again expresses this well:

God the great Creator of all things doth uphold, (Heb. 1:3) direct, dispose, and govern all creatures, actions, and things, (Dan. 4:34–35, Ps. 135:6, Acts 17:25–26,28) from the

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<sup>17</sup> Norman L. Geisler, “Molinism,” *Baker Encyclopedia of Christian Apologetics* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999), 493–494.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 494. Geisler prefers an alternative to middle knowledge because he has God existing outside time: He continues on page 494: “Molinism is not the only alternative to fatalism. God can have *necessary* knowledge of *contingent* acts. He can know for sure what will happen freely. Just because he has certainty about an event does not mean that it does not occur freely. The same event can be necessary from the vantage point of God’s knowledge and free from the standpoint of human choice. If God is omniscient, then he knows everything, including the fact that Judas would betray the Christ. If Judas had not betrayed Christ, God would have been wrong about what he knew. But that does not mean Judas was coerced. For God knew certainly that Judas would betray Christ freely. Just as prerecorded television news segments are of events that cannot be changed but were freely chosen, so God in his omniscience sees the future with the same certainty with which he sees the past. One can hold the same solution to theological mysteries without being a Molinist. God’s knowledge of the future can be necessary without any event being forced.”



greatest even to the least, (Matt. 10:29–31) by His most wise and holy providence, (Prov. 15:3, Ps. 104:24, Ps. 145:17) according to His infallible foreknowledge, (Acts 15:18, Ps. 94:8–11) and the free and immutable counsel of His own will, (Eph. 1:11) to the praise of the glory of His wisdom, power, justice, goodness, and mercy. (Isa. 63:14, Eph. 3:10, Rom. 9:17, Gen. 45:7, Ps. 145:7). . . . The almighty power, unsearchable wisdom, and infinite goodness of God so far manifest themselves in His providence, that it extendeth itself even to the first fall, and all other sins of angels and men; (Rom. 11:32–34, 2 Sam. 24:1, 1 Chron. 21:1, 1 Kings 22:22–23, 1 Chron. 10:4, 13–14, 2 Sam. 16:10, Acts 2:23) and that not by a bare permission, (Acts 14:16) but such as hath joined with it a most wise and powerful bounding, (Ps. 76:10, 2 Kings 19:28) and otherwise ordering, and governing of them, in a manifold dispensation, to His own holy ends; (Gen. 50:20, Isa. 10:6–7, 12).<sup>19</sup>

This description can be succinctly summarized into a working definition of providence:

God is continually involved with all created things in such a way that he (1) keeps them existing and maintaining the properties with which he created them; (2) cooperates with created things in every action, directing their distinctive properties to cause them to act as they do; and (3) directs them to fulfill his purposes.<sup>20</sup>

Providence concerns both preservation and governance. God “upholds the universe by the word of his power” (Heb 11:3). In the same vein, Col 1:16-17 say of Christ that “For by him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible, whether thrones or dominions or rulers or authorities—all things were created through him and for him. And he is before all things, and in him all things hold together.” Grudem observes, “Both verses indicate that if Christ were to cease his continuing activity of sustaining all things in the universe, then all except the triune God would instantly cease to exist.”<sup>21</sup> Erickson notes that

The import of such passages is to deny that any part of the creation is self-sufficient. Some people tend to think of God’s work as ending with creation. In their view, after creation all things have remained in existence simply by virtue of some innate power, but this is rejected by Scripture. Both the origination and the continuation of all things are a matter of divine will and activity. . . . Jesus has also given clear teaching regarding the Father’s work of preservation. The disciples were concerned about the necessities of life—what they would eat and what they would wear. Jesus reassured them that the Father feeds the birds of the air and clothes the flowers of the fields. He would surely do the same for them. After teaching that God provides for the lesser members of his creation, Jesus’s argument moves to humans: they are of more value than birds (Matt.

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<sup>19</sup> *The Westminster Confession of Faith* (Oak Harbor, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc., 1996).

<sup>20</sup> Grudem, *Systematic Theology*, 315.

<sup>21</sup> *Ibid.*, 316.

6:26) and flowers (v. 30). It therefore is not necessary for humans to be anxious about food and clothing, for if they seek God's kingdom and righteousness, all these things will be added to them (vv. 31–33). This is a reference to God's provision.<sup>22</sup>

Providence also means God's governance of all nations of the world. Psalm 103:19 says, "The LORD has established his throne in the heavens, and his kingdom rules over all." God "works all things according to the counsel of his will" (Eph 1:11).

Closely related to providence is the concept of divine sovereignty. Providence refers to God's care and preservation of creation and his creatures. Sovereignty speaks to his ultimate rule and direction of the creation (especially humanity) toward his intended ends.<sup>23</sup>

More explicitly, sovereignty refers to God's ruling supremacy, and so relates to providence. The term expresses God's control of all things. Daniel 4:35 says "all the inhabitants of the earth are accounted as nothing, and he does according to his will among the host of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth; and none can stay his hand or say to him, 'What have you done?'" As Ryrie notes, "Ultimately God is in complete control of all things, though He may choose to let certain events happen according to natural laws that He has ordained. God has a plan (Acts 15:18), which is all-inclusive (Eph. 1:11), which He controls (Ps. 135:6), which includes but does not involve Him in evil (Prov. 16:4), and which ultimately is for the praise of His glory (Eph. 1:14)."<sup>24</sup>

We have now examined sixteen attributes of God that demonstrate how God is unlike us. Some theologians include God's three-in-oneness in their lists. We'll reserve an entire subsequent chapter (10) for considering God as Trinity. For now, we can move on to those attributes of God that he shares with us.

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<sup>22</sup> Erickson, *Christian Theology*, 360-361.

<sup>23</sup> Millard J. Erickson, *The Concise Dictionary of Christian Theology* (Wheaton, IL: Crossway Books, 2001), 162–163.

<sup>24</sup> Ryrie, *Basic Theology*, 49.